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Abstract—In this preliminary work, we study the problem of
distributed authentication in wireless networks. Specifically, we
consider a system where multiple Bob (sensor) nodes listen to
a channel and report their correlated measurements to a Fusion
Center (FC) which makes the ultimate authentication decision.
For the feature-based authentication at the FC, channel impulse
response has been utilized as the device fingerprint. Additionally,
the correlated measurements by the Bob nodes allow us to
invoke Compressed sensing to significantly reduce the reporting
overhead to the FC. Numerical results show that: i) the detection
performance of the FC is superior to that of a single Bob-node,
ii) compressed sensing leads to at least 20% overhead reduction
on the reporting channel at the expense of a small (< 1 dB) SNR
margin to achieve the same detection performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer authentication addresses the problem of in-
trusion (impersonation) attack where a legitimate node Alice
transmits its data to its intended recipient Bob, while Eve is
an intruder node who unlawfully transmits on the channel
allocated to Alice, in order to impersonate Alice before
Bob. More precisely, for intrusion detection, Bob needs to
authenticate each and every data packet it receives from the
channel occupant (Alice or Eve). To carry out the (feature-
based) authentication, Bob performs binary hypothesis testing
while utilizing some device fingerprint (some physical layer
attribute) as the decision metric.
As for the decision metric for binary hypothesis test-
ing, Researchers have considered many different physical-
layer attributes so far. Broadly speaking, these attributes
can be classified into two categories: i) medium-based
attributes, ii) hardware-based attributes. Medium-based at-
tributes/fingerprints include different menifestations of the
wireless channel such as channel frequency response [1],[2],
channel impulse response [3],[4], received signal strength [5],
angle-of-arrival [6] etc. On the other hand, hardware-based
attributes/fingerprints include carrier frequency offsets [7],[8],
IQ-imbalance [9], mismatch parameters of non-reciprocal
hardware [10] etc.
In this preliminary work, motivated by the classical dis-
tributed detection problem [11], we study the distributed
authentication problem. Specifically, we consider a situation
where instead of a single Bob (sensor) node, there are 𝑁
Bob (sensor) nodes which all report their raw measurements
or local decisions to a Fusion Center (FC) which makes
the ultimate authentication decision. The need for Distributed
Authentication arises whenever a single sensor (Bob) node
alone can’t be relied upon (e.g., it could come under deep
fade/shadowing, it might have excessive AWGN/noise figure
due to cheap receive circuitry etc.). Another potential appli-
cation scenario is that of a Wireless Sensor Network [12]
where the sensor (Bob) nodes are primitive in nature (i.e.,
they can’t do sophisticated signal processing by themselves
due to processor, storage and battery constraints); therefore,
the sensor nodes simply relay the critical/sensitive data to the
FC which carries out the ultimate authentication.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are the
following: i) a preliminary study on distributed authentication,
ii) exploitation of compressed sensing at the Bob nodes for
significant reduction of the reporting overhead to the FC.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Following the spirits and motivation of distributed detection
problem [11], this paper studies the distributed authentication
problem whereby 𝑁 number of Bob nodes simultaneously
receive the packet sent by the channel occupant (either Alice or
Eve) on the sensing channel (see Fig. 1). The 𝑁 Bob nodes
are either co-located (in the form of an antenna array), or,
follow a random geometry (where each Bob node represents
a different sensing device). In both scenarios, each Bob node
reports some quantity (either its raw measurement, or, its local
authentication decision) via a reporting channel to a Fusion
Center (FC) which makes the ultimate authentication decision.
Inline with previous literature [11], this work assumes that the
reporting channel is error-free, delay-free and time-slotted (the
performance curves obtained under these assumptions simply
become upper-bounds on the performance curves obtained
under realistic settings where these assumptions don’t hold).
III. BACKGROUND: CHANNEL IMPULSE RESPONSE AS
DEVICE FINGERPRINT
An intrusion (impersonation) attack occurs when an intruder
node Eve unlawfully transmits on the (sensing) channel al-
located to legitimate node Alice so as to impersonate Alice
before Bob. To counter the challenge of intrusion attack, Bob
needs to do authentication of each and every data packet
Fig. 1. The Distributed Authentication problem.
it receives. Motivated by [4], this work utilizes the channel
impulse response (CIR) as the device fingerprint for the pur-
pose of authentication (at Bob nodes, or, Fusion center). More
precisely, this work considers a single-carrier, wideband sys-
tem with a time-slotted sensing channel (with 𝜏 seconds long
timeslots). To introduce the notations, let’s assume that Alice
transmits on the shared sensing channel; then Bob 𝑛 sees the
channel h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐴,𝐵𝑛 . More precisely, h
(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)
𝐴,𝐵𝑛
is the channel impulse
response, i.e., h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐴,𝐵𝑛 = [ℎ𝐴,𝐵𝑛(1) ℎ𝐴,𝐵𝑛(2) ⋯ ℎ𝐴,𝐵𝑛(𝐿)]𝑇
where 𝑛 = 1, ...,𝑁 and 𝐿 represents the total number of
channel taps for the considered multipath (i.e., frequency-
selective), time-invariant channel. Define:
H
(i.i.d)
AB
Δ= [h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐴,𝐵1 h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐴,𝐵2 ⋯ h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐴,𝐵𝑁 ] ∈ ℂ(𝐿×𝑁)
Typically, each of the columns of H(i.i.d)AB is modelled as a
Complex Gaussian vector; moreover, all the columns (channel
vectors) are considered to be i.i.d. However, in this study, we
consider a more general/realistic setting; i.e., we assume that
the channels measured by all the 𝑁 Bob nodes are correlated
(i.e., either all the Bob nodes are co-located, or, all the nodes
in system model of Fig. 1 are located outdoors). Therefore, to
make the columns of the matrix H(i.i.d)AB correlated with each
other (to exploit the phenomena of compressed sensing later),
we leverage the classical Kronecker-product based correlation
model [13]. For the system model in Fig. 1, the Kronecker-
product model reduces to the following:
HAB = 1√
𝑡𝑟(RB)H
(i.i.d)
AB RB
1/2 (1)
where RB ∈ ℝ𝑁×𝑁 represents the correlation matrix at the re-
ceive side (i.e., the correlation among Bob nodes). Specifically,
we employ the exponential correlation model: [RB]𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜌∣𝑖−𝑗∣
where 0 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1 is the correlation amount and 𝑖, 𝑗 represent
row and column indices of RB (or, Bob 𝑖 and Bob 𝑗) respec-
tively. Then, one can write: HAB
Δ= [h𝐴,𝐵1 h𝐴,𝐵2 ⋯ h𝐴,𝐵𝑁 ].
Similarly, when Eve transmits on the shared sensing chan-
nel, then one can define:
H
(i.i.d)
EB
Δ= [h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐸,𝐵1 h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐸,𝐵2 ⋯ h(𝑖.𝑖.𝑑)𝐸,𝐵𝑁 ] ∈ ℂ(𝐿×𝑁)
The channel matrix HEB
Δ= [h𝐸,𝐵1 h𝐸,𝐵2 ⋯ h𝐸,𝐵𝑁 ] with
correlated columns is then constructed via Eq. (1) as well1.
IV. DISTRIBUTED AUTHENTICATION
This section outlines the proposed distributed authentication
framework which in turn utilizes the channel impulse response
as the transmit device fingerprint.
During 𝑚-th timeslot, either Alice, or, Eve will transmit
on the sensing channel (assuming that Eve avoids collisions
so as to stay undetected). Therefore, when Bob 𝑛 receives a
packet from the channel occupant (CO) (where CO ∈ {𝐴,𝐸}),
it independently generates a measurement z𝑛(𝑚) of its local
CIR h𝐶𝑂,𝐵𝑛 as follows [4]:
z𝑛(𝑚) = h𝐶𝑂,𝐵𝑛 + v𝑛(𝑚) (2)
where v𝑛(𝑚) is the measurement noise. Specifically, v𝑛(𝑚) ∼CN(0,Σ𝑛) where Σ𝑛 = 𝜎2𝑛(S𝐻S)−1 ∈ ℝ𝐿×𝐿; 𝜎2𝑛 denotes
the variance/power of the AWGN at Bob 𝑛. Furthermore, we
assume that v𝑛(𝑚) (𝑛 = 1, ...,𝑁 ) are i.i.d2.
With the raw measurements of local CIR available at each
Bob node, two distinct strategies are possible: i) each Bob node
sends its raw measurement as is (along with the ground truth)
to the FC, ii) each Bob node does the authentication locally
and sends its binary decision to the FC. Both strategies are
discussed below.
A. Each Bob node sends its raw measurement as-is to the
Fusion Center
Under this scenario, each Bob node sends its raw measure-
ment z𝑛 as-is (along with the ground truth) to the FC3. Since
an error-free, time-slotted reporting channel is assumed, FC
receives all the (perfect) measurements after 𝑁 time-slots (of
the reporting channel). Fusion center then constructs a global
measurement vector z∗
Δ= [z𝑇1 z𝑇2 ⋯ z𝑇𝑁 ]𝑇 . Then, we can
write:
z∗ = hCO,B∗ + v∗ (3)
where hCO,B∗
Δ= [h𝑇𝐶𝑂,𝐵1 h𝑇𝐶𝑂,𝐵2 ⋯ h𝑇𝐶𝑂,𝐵𝑁 ]𝑇 and v∗ Δ=[v𝑇1 v𝑇2 ⋯ v𝑇𝑁 ]𝑇 . v∗ represents the global estimation error;
v∗ ∼ CN(0,Σ∗) where Σ∗ = 𝑏𝑙𝑘𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(Σ1 Σ2 ⋯ Σ𝑁)∈ ℝ(𝐿×𝑁)×(𝐿×𝑁).
With z∗ available, the FC casts the sender-node authentica-
tion problem as a binary hypothesis testing problem:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝐻0 ∶ z∗ = hAB∗ + v∗
𝐻1 ∶ z∗ = hEB∗ + v∗ (4)
where hAB∗ = [h𝑇𝐴,𝐵1 ,h𝑇𝐴,𝐵2 , ...,h𝑇𝐴,𝐵𝑁 ]𝑇 and hEB∗ =[h𝑇𝐸,𝐵1 ,h𝑇𝐸,𝐵2 , ...,h𝑇𝐸,𝐵𝑁 ]𝑇 . Then, z∗∣𝐻0 ∼ CN(hAB∗,Σ∗)
and z∗∣𝐻1 ∼ CN(hEB∗,Σ∗).
1At this point, it is worth mentioning that we haven’t incorporated the
transmit side correlation (between Alice’s antenna and Eve’s antenna) into
the Kronecker product model. The reason for this is that, inline with the
previous work [1], we assume that Alice and Eve are spaced far apart (more
than one wavelength) so that their mutual correlation is negligible.
2S is the matrix formed by the training symbols. See [4] for more details.
3For clarity of exposition, we drop the time-slot index 𝑚 in the rest of this
paper.
Next, assuming that hAB∗ is known to the FC (via the prior
training of the Bob nodes, on a secure channel) with sufficient
accuracy, the FC applies the following test [4]:
(z∗ − hAB∗)𝐻Σ∗−1(z∗ − hAB∗) 𝐻1≷
𝐻0
𝛿 (5)
where 𝛿 is the comparison threshold whose value is to be
determined by the FC. This work follows Neyman-Pearson
procedure to systematically compute the threshold 𝛿. Specif-
ically, 𝛿 is computed from a pre-specified, maximum Type-1
error (i.e., probability of false alarm, 𝑃𝑓𝑎) that the FC can tol-
erate. Then, for a given Type-1 error, Neyman-Pearson method
guarantees to minimize the Type-2 error (i.e., probability of
missed detection, 𝑃𝑚𝑑).
Denote by 𝑇 the test statistic in Eq. (5); i.e., 𝑇 = (z∗ −
hAB∗)𝐻Σ∗−1(z∗ − hAB∗). Then, the test statistic 𝑇 ∣𝐻0 ∼
𝜒2(2𝑁𝐿); i.e., 𝑇 has central Chi-squared distribution with
2𝑁𝐿 degrees of freedom, under 𝐻0. Then, the probability of
false alarm 𝑃𝑓𝑎 (i.e., incorrectly identifying Alice’s packet as
if it is from Eve) is given as:
𝑃𝑓𝑎 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇 > 𝛿∣𝐻0) = ∫ ∞
𝛿
𝑝𝑇 ∣𝐻0(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 (6)
where 𝑝𝑇 ∣𝐻0(𝑥) ∼ 𝜒2(2𝑁𝐿) is the probability density func-
tion of 𝑇 ∣𝐻0. Thus, one can set 𝑃𝑓𝑎 to some value 𝛼 in Eq.
(6) and solve for the threshold 𝛿.
With 𝑃𝑓𝑎 = 𝛼, the performance of the hypothesis test in
Eq. (5) is solely characterized by the Type-2 error a.k.a the
probability of missed detection: 𝑃𝑚𝑑 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇 < 𝛿∣𝐻1). Since
computing the distribution of 𝑇 ∣𝐻1 is quite involved, we
numerically compute the value of 𝑃𝑚𝑑 in simulation section.
B. Each Bob node sends its local decision to the Fusion
Center
Under this scenario, Bob node 𝑛 (independently) utilizes
its measurement z𝑛 of its local CIR h𝐶𝑂,𝐵𝑛 (see Eq. (2)) to
construct the following binary hypothesis testing problem:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝐻0 ∶ z𝑛 = h𝐴,𝐵𝑛 + v𝑛
𝐻1 ∶ z𝑛 = h𝐸,𝐵𝑛 + v𝑛 (7)
Once again, assuming that h𝐴,𝐵𝑛 is perfectly known to Bob
𝑛, it applies the following test [4]:
(z𝑛 − h𝐴,𝐵𝑛)𝐻Σ−1𝑛 (z𝑛 − h𝐴,𝐵𝑛) 𝐻1≷
𝐻0
𝛿𝑛 (8)
where 𝛿𝑛 is the comparison threshold whose value is to be
determined by Bob 𝑛. Once again, we follow the Neyman-
Pearson procedure to systematically compute the threshold 𝛿𝑛.
Denote by 𝑇𝑛 the test statistic in Eq. (8); i.e., 𝑇𝑛 = (z𝑛 −
h𝐴,𝐵𝑛)𝐻Σ−1𝑛 (z𝑛 − h𝐴,𝐵𝑛). Then, the test statistic 𝑇𝑛∣𝐻0 ∼
𝜒2(2𝐿); i.e., 𝑇𝑛 has central Chi-squared distribution with 2𝐿
degrees of freedom, under 𝐻0. Then, the probability of false
alarm 𝑃𝑓𝑎,𝑛 is given as:
𝑃𝑓𝑎,𝑛 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑛 > 𝛿𝑛∣𝐻0) = ∫ ∞
𝛿𝑛
𝑝𝑇𝑛∣𝐻0(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 (9)
where 𝑝𝑇𝑛∣𝐻0(𝑥) ∼ 𝜒2(2𝐿) is the probability density function
of 𝑇𝑛∣𝐻0. Thus, one can set 𝑃𝑓𝑎,𝑛 to some value 𝛼𝑛 in Eq.
(9) and solve for the threshold 𝛿𝑛.
With 𝑃𝑓𝑎,𝑛 = 𝛼𝑛, the performance of the hypothesis test in
Eq. (8) is solely characterized by the Type-2 error a.k.a the
probability of missed detection: 𝑃𝑚𝑑,𝑛 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑛 < 𝛿𝑛∣𝐻1).
Since it is difficult to compute the distribution of 𝑇𝑛∣𝐻1, we
numerically compute the value of 𝑃𝑚𝑑,𝑛 in simulation section.
Then, the Fusion Center, having received the vector of
local (binary-valued, hard) decisions u∗ by all the Bob nodes,
applies the following (heuristic) fusion rules to generate the
ultimate (binary-valued, hard) decision: i) OR (optimistic) rule,
ii) AND (pessimistic) rule, iii) majority voting, iv) averaging.
V. OVERHEAD REDUCTION ON REPORTING CHANNEL VIA
COMPRESSED SENSING
This section attempts to invoke Compressed Sensing4 at
the Bob nodes owing to the fact that the CIR measurements
made by the Bob nodes are correlated (see Eq. 1). To this
end, this section focuses on a specialized system model (more
than the one given in Fig. 1 earlier) whereby the 𝑁 (𝑁 is
large) Bob nodes are all co-located as a linear antenna-array
on a single receive device, now-called the relay node. Such
system model could represent, for example, a situation where a
multi-antenna relay node (e.g., a massive MIMO base station)
forwards the data of a source (with unknown identity) towards
a destination (the FC). This specialized system model allows
us to invoke compressed sensing (CS) at the relay node (to
compress the length-𝑁𝐿 report vector into a length-𝑀 vector
where 𝑀 << 𝑁𝐿) to reduce the number of channel uses
(from 𝑁 to 𝑀 ) on the reporting channel. At this point, it
is worth mentioning that to exploit compressed sensing under
the generalized system model shown in Fig. 1, one needs to
employ more sophisticated medium access schemes on the
reporting channel (which is beyond the scope of this work)5.
Once again, having received the data from the (sensing)
channel occupant (Alice or Eve), the relay node could adapt
either of the two distinct compress-and-forward strategies: i)
the relay node compresses the vector of raw measurements and
sends it to the FC (along with the vector of ground truths), ii)
the relay node compresses the vector of local decisions and
sends it to the FC. Both strategies are discussed below.
A. The relay node compresses the vector of raw measurements
and sends it to the Fusion Center
The relay node compresses the vector of raw measurements
z∗ ∈ ℂ(𝑁𝐿×1) (see Eq. 3) into a vector y ∈ ℂ(𝑀×1) (𝑀 <<
𝑁𝐿) via random projections method:
y =Φz∗ (10)
where Φ ∈ ℝ(𝑀×𝑁𝐿) is a random matrix, the so-called
sensing/measurement matrix, whose entries are typically the
realizations of i.i.d Gaussian or Bernoulli variables.
4[14] provides a comprehensive overview of compressed sensing.
5[15] presents a scheme where during each of the 𝑀 time-slots, each of
the 𝑁 sensor nodes transmits its local measurement to the FC with some
probability 𝑝, thus making the sensing/measurement matrix Φ non-Gaussian.
After the compression, the relay node transmits the vector
y to the FC in 𝑀 time-slots. Due to the error-free reporting
channel, the FC receives y as-is; therefore, its task becomes to
recover an estimate zˆ∗ of z∗ from y. To this end, we invoke
the classical Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP) algorithm
at the FC [16]. Specifically, the OMP solves the following
𝑙1-norm minimization problem:
min ∣∣z0∣∣𝑙1 𝑠.𝑡. y =ΦΨ𝑇 z0 (11)
where
z0 =Ψz∗ (12)
is the actual 𝐾-sparse representation of z∗ in a transform
domain. The matrix Ψ is called the sparsifying basis. The most
frequently used sparsifying basis Ψ include discrete fourier
transform (DFT), discrete cosine transform (DCT), Karhunen-
Loeve Transform (KLT) etc. Finally, when zˆ∗ is available via
Eqs. (11),(12), the FC follows the procedure of Section-IV-A
to carry out the authentication.
At this point, it is necessary to emphasize that the invocation
of compressing sensing at the relay node is feasible only when
the vector z∗ is 𝐾-sparse (for some 𝐾 << 𝑁𝐿) in some
transform domain. This condition is fulfilled when the channel
under consideration exhibits spatial correlation (see Eq. 1)
[17]. Typically, the reconstruction error E = 𝔼[∣∣zˆ∗ − z∗∣∣2𝑙2]
decreases with increase in 𝜌 (see Eq. 1) and vice versa.
B. The relay node compresses the vector of local decisions
and sends it to the Fusion Center
Under this strategy, the relay node compresses the vec-
tor of local decisions u∗ ∈ {0,1}(𝑁𝐿×1) into a vector y∈ {0,1}(𝑀×1) (𝑀 << 𝑁𝐿) via random projections method
and transmits y to the FC in 𝑀 time-slots, as discussed above.
The FC then recovers uˆ∗ from y via OMP and follows the
procedure of Section-IV-B to carry out the authentication task.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume uniform power delay profile (PDP) to generate
each of the 𝑁 CIRs (with 𝐿 = 6 taps each) on the sensing
channel. The received SNR at Bob 𝑛 is defined as 1/𝜎2𝑛 where
𝜎2𝑛 is the power of AWGN at Bob 𝑛. Furthermore, we evaluate
the case of homogeneous SNRs only (i.e., we assume that
the SNR/link quality of all the 𝑁 sensing links is the same).
Finally, in all the results below, we evaluate the detection
probability 𝑃𝑑 (where 𝑃𝑑 = 1−𝑃𝑚𝑑) of the FC as the SNR (of
a single sensing link) is varied over its full operational range.
Fig. 2 represents the case when Bob nodes send their Raw
Measurements to the FC. For Fig. 2, we set 𝑁 = 10; the
threshold 𝛿 is varied over the range: 260 ∶ 20 ∶ 340. Fig. 2
shows that with decrease in 𝛿 (or, equivalently, with increase
in the false alarm rate 𝑃𝑓𝑎), the detection probability increases
as one would intuitively expect. Additionally, the detection
performance remains stable to a high value (close to 1) for
SNR (at the FC) as low as 5 dB.
Fig. 3 represents the case when Bob nodes send their
Local Decisions to FC. In Fig. 3, 𝑁 = 10; additionally,
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Fig. 2. Bob nodes send their Raw Measurements to FC (right-side plot shows
the zoomed-in view (corresponding to SNR ∈ 0−5 dB) of the left-side plot).
from top to bottom, each of the 𝑁 thresholds is varied as:
𝛿𝑛 ∈ {39,32.9,26.2} which maps to the false alarm rates:
𝑃𝑓𝑎,𝑛 ∈ {0.0001,0.001,0.01} respectively. Fig. 3 shows that
the AND-ing (OR-ing) based pessimistic (optimistic) fusion
rule performs the best (worst) while the performance of the
Majority Voting (Averaging) fusion rule is slightly better than
(same as) the performance achieved by a single Bob node.
Additionally, from top to bottom, sacrifice in terms of more
and more false alarm rate results in improvement of detection
performance of all the schemes for any given SNR.
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Fig. 3. Bob nodes send their Local Decisions to the FC (right-side plot shows
the zoomed-in view of the left-side plot).
Figs. 4, 5 show the results equivalent to Figs 2, 3 when
the Bob nodes (a.k.a the relay node) invoke the compressed
sensing before sending their measurements to the FC. For
compressed sensing, we have used a Gaussian measurement
matrix Φ and DCT as the sparsifying basis Ψ.
Fig. 4 represents the case when Bob nodes send their raw
measurements to the FC after compressed sensing. In Fig. 4,
we set 𝑁 = 100; the threshold 𝛿 is varied in the range: 𝛿 ∈{2600,4800,5000}. The compressed sensing compresses the
length 𝑁 × 𝐿 = 100 × 6 = 600 measurement vector z∗ into a
length 𝑀 = 480 vector achieving a saving of 20% in reporting
overhead. Fig. 4 basically compares the two strategies by the
relay node: S1) the relay node does the CS prior to sending
the raw measurement vector to the FC, S2) the relay node
sends the raw measurement vector as-is to the FC. Fig. 4
indicates that a small (< 1 dB) SNR margin is needed by
S1 to achieve the same detection performance as S2, due to
finite reconstruction error E at the FC.
Fig. 5 represents the case when Bob nodes send their local
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Fig. 4. Bob nodes send their raw measurements to the FC via compressed
sensing (right-side plot shows the zoomed-in view of the left-side plot).
decisions to the FC after compressed sensing. In Fig. 5, we
set 𝑁 = 100; additionally, from top to bottom, each of the
𝑁 thresholds 𝛿𝑛 is varied in the range: 𝛿𝑛 ∈ {39,32.9,26.2}
which maps to the following false alarm rates: 𝑃𝑓𝑎,𝑛 ∈{0.0001,0.001,0.01} respectively. In all the three plots, the
performance of the majority voting based fusion rule is con-
sidered with and without compressed sensing at the Bob nodes.
In this case, compressed sensing at the Bob nodes leads to a
30% overhead reduction on the reporting channel.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
SNR
Pd
 
 
MAJ Voting
CS@MAJ Voting
AVG
Individual Bob
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
SNR
Pd
 
 
MAJ Voting
CS@MAJ Voting
AVG
Individual Bob
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
SNR
Pd
 
 
MAJ Voting
CS@MAJ Voting
AVG
Individual Bob
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
SNR
Pd
 
 
MAJ Voting
CS@MAJ Voting
AVG
Individual Bob
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
SNR
Pd
 
 
MAJ Voting
CS@MAJ Voting
AVG
Individual Bob
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
SNR
Pd
 
 
MAJ Voting
CS@MAJ Voting
AVG
Individual Bob
Fig. 5. Bob nodes send their local decisions to the FC via compressed sensing
(right-side plot shows the zoomed-in view of the left-side plot).
VII. CONCLUSION
We did a preliminary study on the problem of distributed
authentication in wireless networks. Specifically, we consid-
ered a system where multiple Bob (sensor) nodes listen to a
channel and report their correlated measurements to a Fusion
Center (FC). Numerical results showed that the authentication
performance of the FC is superior to that of a single Bob
node. Additionally, the correlated measurements by the Bob
nodes allowed us to invoke compressed sensing at the Bob
nodes to reduce the reporting overhead to the FC by at least
20%. Immediate future work will investigate the design of: i)
optimal decision rules at the Bob nodes and the FC, ii) clever
medium access schemes on the reporting channel.
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